Libor是如何被操纵的？

早在08年银行一个经济周会上，一个英镑掉期交易员告诉初级经济学家和经理，“Libor与其本身脱节了”，这是我第一次听到这句话。这句话听起来很荒谬，似乎只是糊弄大家，并引起一小片的笑声。

虽然不久以后，我曾准备了一个演讲，给公司公关经理解释“Libor与其本身脱节了”的意思。我尝试通过公司内部和外部的邮件解开这句话的含义。我甚至公开在公司客户面前谈到这句话。

我对这句话的解释是：银行在人为操控Libor。只是我当时没有看见类似的言论。

一个交易员告诉我们，我们银行不能被人发现在高利率借贷，所以我们递交了和别人一样低的Libor的报价。要做到这点太简单了。收集利率报价的英国银行工会（BBA）是不会检查报价的。那个交易员还说，每天把报价下调几个基点是一个潜规则。

据那个交易员所说，“每个人都知道”“每个人都这么做”。没有人觉得这是违法的。要知道，那个会议房子里有二三十人，其中不乏高层管理者、经济学家、结构性团队、营销人员，还有大部分是在电话会议上的来自不同国家的人。

会上的讨论就像光明正大的。完全没有秘密集会的迹象。

每天最重要的事务是应对日益严重的危机。我做作为银行销售团队一员，面对的最重要问题是该如何赚取收入。

最好的办法是临场应对。信用管理委员和上层管理者要求公司银行部门，只要客户违反合约，无论多么微不足道，都要把客户贷款条款中基准利率被换成Libor利率并把信用息差大幅上浮。公司银行部门的员工很难跟客户解释，我们不得不帮忙。

我们陪同公关经理给客户解释经济究竟怎么了？为什么基准利率不能持续？为什么信用利差不得不大幅上浮？当然，我们解释会提及宏观经济环境的背景。

作为其中的一部分，我不得不解释“Libor与其本身脱节了”的意思。正如那个交易员所说，每个人都知道根本不可能用Libor的利率借到钱——你只要看看我们的信用掉期（担保银行能继续经营的保险）的价格，就知道有问题了。

比如说，Libor报价是2%，银行可能要付出5%或6%的利息才能借到钱。所以，我们要在Libor的价格上外加3%到4%才能勉强赚到钱。这就是我们告诉客户的。

回个头看，我对我的天真感到羞愧。如果我知道事情会这样发展，我应该向有关部门举报的。这都是公开的，说明没有合谋或者秘密。会议上有这么多高层管理者和各国的银行的财政部门员工，根本不可能有什么秘密。

“Libor与其本身脱节了”有一个最好的原因——隐匿银行内部存在的问题。

An anonymous insider from one of Britain's biggest lenders – aside from Barclays – explains how he and his colleagues helped manipulate the UK's bank borrowing rate. Neither the insider nor the bank can be identified for legal reasons.

It was during a weekly economic briefing at the bank in early 2008 that I first heard the phrase. A sterling swaps trader told the assembled economists and managers that "Libor was dislocated with itself". It sounded so nonsensical that, at first, it just confused everyone, and provoked a little laughter.

Before long, though, I was drawing up presentations to explain the "dislocation of Libor from itself" for corporate relationship managers. I was deciphering the subject in emails, internally and externally. And I was using the phrase myself openly with customers of the bank.

What I was explaining was that the bank was manipulating Libor. Only I didn't see it like that at the time.

What the trader told us was that the bank could not be seen to be borrowing at high rates, so we were putting in low Libor submissions, the same as everyone. How could we do that? Easy. The British Bankers' Association, which compiled Libor, asked for a rate submission but there were no checks. The trader said there was a general acceptance that you lowered the price a few basis points each day.

According to the trader, "everyone knew" and "everyone was doing it". There was no implication of illegality. After all, there were 20 to 30 people in the room – from management to economists, structuring teams to salespeople – and more on the teleconference dial-in from across the country.

The discussion was so open the behaviour seemed above board. In no sense was this a clandestine gathering.

The main business of the day was to deal with the deepening crisis. And questions were raised about what we, in one of the bank's sales teams, could be doing to earn our wages.

The answer was fire-fighting. Helping the corporate bank with clients – predominantly explaining why the customer's loan was being moved from base rate to Libor and why their interest margin was increasing sharply. It wasn't easy for the corporate bankers. They were under orders from the credit committee, and powers at the top, to change a client's borrowing rate to Libor and increase the margin if any covenant was breached, no matter how small.

We accompanied the relationship managers to meetings to explain what was happening in the economy – why base rate lending could not be sustained, why margins had to increase, and of course to explain the general economic backdrop.

As part of that, we had to explain the "dislocation of Libor from itself". As the trader put it, everyone knew that we couldn't borrow at Libor, you only needed to look at the price of our credit default swaps – effectively survival insurance for the bank – to see that.

What that meant was that even though Libor may have been, for example 2pc, the real Libor rate the bank was paying was more like 5pc or 6pc. So in fact, we needed to be lending money at Libor plus 3pc or 4pc just to break even. That is what we were telling clients.

Looking back, I now feel ashamed by my naivety. Had I realised what was going on, I would have blown the whistle. But the openness alone suggested no collusion or secrecy. Management had been in the meeting, and so many areas of the Treasury pision of the bank represented, that this was clearly no surprise or secret.

Libor had dislocated with itself for a very good reason – to hide the true issues within the bank.

原文地址：http://www.icjzx.com/cn/news/eye/201305/06280.html
本文关键字：Libor
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